考虑模糊需求和不公平厌恶的批发价格契约与协调  

Wholesale Price Contract and Coordination Considering Fuzzy Demand and Inequity Aversion

作　　者：王宁宁[1] 王晓欢[1] 樊治平[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110169

出　　处：《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》2015年第9期1358-1362,共5页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71201020);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2013M540233);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(N140607001;N140604003)

摘　　要：针对模糊需求下的批发价格契约与协调问题,基于Fehr和Schmidt提出的不公平厌恶模型,构建了考虑零售商不公平厌恶的批发价格契约模型,并通过模型推导及数值实验分析了零售商不公平厌恶对其订货量以及供应链利润的影响.研究结果表明,随着零售商的不利不公平厌恶程度的增加,零售商的最优订货量及供应链利润均减小;随着零售商的有利不公平厌恶程度的增加,零售商的最优订货量及供应商利润均增加,且零售商利润和供应链总利润均先增后减;此外,批发价格契约在一定条件下可以实现供应链协调.For the problem of wholesale price contract and coordination under fuzzy demand,a wholesale price contract model considering retailer′s inequity aversion was constructed based on the inequity aversion model proposed by Fehr and Schmidt.Then,the impacts of retailer′s inequity aversion on order quantity and supply chain profit were analyzed through model reasoning and numerical experiment.The results showed that retailer′s optimal order quantity and supply chain profit will decrease as retailer′s disadvantageous inequity aversion increases.Retailer′s order quantity and supplier′s profit will increase,and retailer′s profit as well as the total profit of whole supply chain will first increase and then decrease,as retailer′s advantageous inequity aversion increases.In addition,wholesale price contract can coordinate supply chain under certain conditions.

关 键 词：模糊需求 不公平厌恶 批发价格契约 订货量 协调 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学] F274