服务型制造防串谋机制研究  

Mechanism Research of Collusion Proof in Service-oriented Manufacturing

作　　者：彭本红[1,2] 谷晓芬 周倩倩[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京信息工程大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210044 [2]中国制造业发展研究院,江苏南京210044

出　　处：《技术与创新管理》2015年第5期449-455,共7页Technology and Innovation Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71263040);江苏省社科基金(13EYB013);中国制造业发展研究院课题(SK20130090-5)

摘　　要：在服务型制造网络中,如何控制模块商的串谋行为是制造商实现收益最大化的关键。基于相对绩效方法,建立模块商串谋不可能、基于产出结果签订私下契约进行串谋、基于努力选择签订私下契约进行串谋3种情况下的委托代理模型。结果表明:相对绩效的激励机制可提高模块商努力水平;模块商通过签订基于产出的私下契约实现串谋是可能的,但会损害制造商的效益;模块商产出相关性较低时,签订基于努力选择的私下契约对制造商反而更有利。因此,在模块商产出相关性较低时,制造商可授权模块商签订基于努力选择的私下契约;产出相关性较高时,若能判定模块商不串谋,采取相对绩效激励机制是最佳选择,若无法判定是否有串谋,则应考虑降低模块商串谋的可能性。Modular service is a typical performance of service-oriented manufacturing. How to control the collusion behavior of module makers is the key to maximize business manufacturer＇ s profits. Based on the method of relative performance eval- uation, this paper established three principal-agent models including collusion impossibility of module makers, collusion un- der the circumstance of signing a side contract of output and effort level. Research showed that the incentive mechanism of relative performance can improve the module makers＇ effort level;that the collusion action is possible when module makers sign a side contract based on output,which does harm to manufacturer＇ s benefits ;that when module makers have low output correlation, signing a side contract based on the choose of effort to realize collusion is better for the manufacturer. Therefore, the manufacturer can authorize a module maker to sign a side contract based on effort selection when there is a low output correlation coefficient;when the correlation is high, if judging that module makers＇ collusion is impossible, the manufacturer can adopt the relative performance incentive mechanism, which is the best choice in this case ;if the manufacturer is unable to determine whether there is collusion, reducing the possibility of module makers＇ collusion should be considered.

关 键 词：服务型制造 多代理人 防串谋 私下契约 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]