工程招投标中的不完全信息静态博弈研究  

Research on the Incomplete Message Static Game in Engineering Bidding

作　　者：丁天维 刘亚臣[1] 

机构地区：[1]沈阳建筑大学,辽宁沈阳110000

出　　处：《辽宁工业大学学报（自然科学版）》2015年第4期269-274,共6页Journal of Liaoning University of Technology(Natural Science Edition)

摘　　要：招标机制和投标决策机制在国外建筑招投标市场中应用已久,借助不完全信息静态博弈、复合标底中标和经评审的最低价中标等方法,建立相应静态博弈模型来分析我国建筑市场的内在矛盾、理顺建筑市场里的利益链条、剖析建筑市场中的交易机制,以清晰的理论链条贯穿建筑市场各参与方的经济行为。最终在保证工程质量、避免工程预算失控的前提下实现工程成本的最低化,使社会资源得到有效、合理配置。The bidding mechanism and basic procedures are applied to foreign construction bidding market for a long time, With the aid of methods such as the incomplete message static game theory, composite base bid and the lowest bid after the review, the corresponding static game model is built in order to analyze the inherent contradictions in the construction market, straighten the interests chain in the construction market, analyze the trading mechanism in the construction market and further specify the participants’ economic behaviors of the various construction market on the clear theory chain. At last under the premise of guaranteeing the project quality and engineering budget in control, the engineering cost is the lowest and the social resources are allocated effectively and reasonably.

关 键 词：招投标 静态博弈 复合标底中标法 经评审的最低价中标法 

分 类 号：C931.2[经济管理—管理学]