关联交易、外部监督与盈余持续性——基于A股上市公司的经验证据  

Related-party Transaction, External Supervision and Earning Persistence Empirical Evidence Related to Listed Companies in A-share Market

作　　者：汪健[1] 曲晓辉[2] 

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学商学院,安徽蚌埠233041 [2]厦门大学财务管理与会计研究院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2015年第9期49-55,共7页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(13AJY005);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(12JJD790030)

摘　　要：本文以2007~2012年A股上市公司关联交易数据和财务数据为样本,检验上市公司关联交易行为对盈余持续性的影响。研究发现,相对于没有关联交易公司,发生关联交易公司的盈余持续性较低;相对于交易规模小的公司,关联交易规模越大的公司的盈余持续性越低,关联交易行为对盈余持续性具有抑制作用。高质量审计和机构投资者持股提高了盈余持续性。发生关联交易的公司,在关联交易与高质量审计或机构投资者持股的共同作用下,其增量盈余持续性显著为正。进一步研究表明,良好的公司治理结构提高了盈余持续性。This paper examines the relationship between related-party transactions （RPTs） and earnings persistence based on sample of A-share listed companies＇ financial and related-party transaction data from 2007 to 2012. We find that companies with RPTs have lower earnings persistence than non-RPT companies, and the bigger the scale of RPT is, the lower is earnings persistence. RPTs have a constraining effect on earnings persistence. We also find that high-quality auditing and institutional shareholding can increase earnings persistence. It shows that the additional earnings persistence is significantly positive after examining the joint effects of RPTs with outside governance characteristics such as high-quality auditing and institutional shareholding. Additional test shows that good corporate governance structure can improve earnings persistence.

关 键 词：关联交易 机构投资者持股 审计 盈余持续性 

分 类 号：F234.3[经济管理—会计学]