软件外包的两阶段付款合同设计:考虑双边期权价值的纳什谈判方法与实证  

Two-stage payment contract design for software offshoring:A Nash bargain method embedded with bilateral real options

作　　者：石晓军[1] 张顺明[1] Hiroshi Tsuji 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学财政金融学院,北京100872 [2]日本大阪府立大学系统科学学院

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2015年第7期1-12,共12页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972001);国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(70825003)

摘　　要：提出采用两阶段付款合同控制软件外包风险、降低承接商道德风险行为.扩展了Feenstra和Hanson关于外包的产权模型,融入了软件外包双方的实物期权价值.认为包出方持有的灵活性期权价值可以用一个带有中间检查标准的Down-and-Out障碍期权加以描述,而承接商的灵活性则可以用一个交换期权进行描述.通过包出方和承接商努力的"混合"性刻画软件外包的特殊性,也基于这个性质采用事后的纳什谈判模型求均衡解.得到求解两阶段付款合同设计的方程组.设计了反映包出方、承接商与包出软件三类特性的经济实验方法,获得中日软件外包中资深外包经理对灵活性期权价值的认知,对模型的主要结论进行实证检验,得到支持性证据.We propose a two-stage payment contracting to mitigate offshoring risk by means of taming the vendor’s possible moral hazard behavior. By capturing the real-option features in the offshoring,we expand the classic property-right models for outsourcing by Feenstra and Hanson. We specify the client’s flexibility in this contracting as a down-and-out barrier call option while the vendor’s as an exchange option. We use the mixed efforts of the client and the vendor to characterize the complex process of software offshoring. Also,a Nash bargaining structure is employed to find the equilibrium ratio of the first stage payment incorporating the option values,due to the mixed nature which makes it hard to specify the terms of contracts in an ax ante manner.An experimental method covering the features of the client,the vendor and the software is designed to elicit the perceptions of the option values from the seasoned managers in Japan’s software offshoring. Using the data from the experiments,we find strong evidence supporting our model predictions on the impacts of options,volatilities and value-inflation-factor on the payment arrangement.

关 键 词：软件外包 实物期权 付款合同设计 

分 类 号：C931.6[经济管理—管理学]