政府干预与机构支农行为--理论分析与中国农村金融市场的经验证据  

Government Intervention and Institutions' Agriculture-supporting Behavior:Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Evidence from China's Rural Financial Market

作　　者：武丽娟[1,2] 徐璋勇[1] 靳共元[2] 

机构地区：[1]西北大学中国西部经济发展研究中心,经济管理学院,陕西西安710127 [2]山西大学商务学院,山西太原030031

出　　处：《预测》2015年第5期34-40,共7页Forecasting

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学基地重大招标项目(11JJD790022)

摘　　要：本文通过构建理论模型对政府干预与农村金融机构支农行为的内在作用机制进行了数理分析,结果显示:早期的农村金融市场上,政府干预是必要的;但现有政府干预方式在初期有效,当农村金融市场变得完善和发达时,干预效果不佳;同时现有干预还会诱发农户发生道德风险,无助于缓解农村资金外流现象。这一结论可以对中国农村金融市场上金融机构支农行为演变的历史轨迹做出很好的阐释。最后提出通过调整政府干预方式来引导农村金融机构主动支农,提高支农效率,从根本上解决农民贷款难题的政策建议。This paper constructs a theoretical model to analyze the internal mechanism of government intervention and institutions’ support agriculture behavior. The main results are as follows：First, government intervention is necessary in the undeveloped rural financial market. Second, the existing way of government intervention is effective in the undevel-oped rural market while ineffective in the developed rural market. Third, the existing way of intervention can’ t help to reduce moral hazard and capital outflows. The conclusions above can make a good interpretation of the historical trajectory of financial institutions’ support agriculture behavior in Chinese rural financial market. Finally, the paper suggests that adjusting government intervention methods will be a useful way to induce financial institutions to support agriculture actively and effectively.

关 键 词：农村金融机构 政府干预 支农行为 

分 类 号：F832.0[经济管理—金融学]