不完全信息均衡向完全信息转化的供应链质量合同设计  

Quality Contract Design for the Supply Chain with Shifting Equilibria from Incomplete Information to Complete Information

作　　者：刘威延[1,2] 苏秦[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,西安710049 [2]西安交通大学机械制造系统工程国家重点实验室,西安710049

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2015年第5期748-755,共8页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872091);高等学校博士点专项基金资助项目(20090201110031)

摘　　要：研究了不完全信息条件下,供应商和生产商的博弈均衡与完全信息条件下的区别,通过质量合同设计的方法实现引导双方博弈均衡转化为完全信息条件均衡或理想均衡。研究结果表明:当供应商单方面拥有私人成本信息时,供应商和生产商的收益都可能受到不利影响,并给出促成双方实现声明博弈的一般合同形式;当双方均拥有私人成本信息时,均衡将受到初始状态的影响,探讨了引导双方向理想均衡收敛的具体合同参数设置,分析了博弈双方表现出不同心理特征时,为达成理想均衡合同参数应满足的条件。The differenee between the equilibria with complete and incomplete information is studied in a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a manufacturer. The result implies that when only the supplier has her own private cost information, both the supplier and the producer are worse-off. The contract that can be used by manufacturer when only the supplier has her own private cost information is proposed in a general form. When both supplier and manufacturer have their own private cost information, the game equilibrium depends on the initial state and the parameters, leading to an expected equilibrium. The conditions to be satisfied when both players bear different mental eharacteristics are discussed as well.

关 键 词：供应链管理 质量控制 不完全信息 声明博弈 演化博弈 行为博弈 

分 类 号：F224.3[经济管理—国民经济]