基于演化博弈的供应链成员间研发竞争与合作分析  

R&D Competition and Cooperation among Members in Supply Chain Based on Evolutionary Game

作　　者：朱莹[1] 张成科[2] 朱怀念[2] 

机构地区：[1]广东工业大学管理学院,广东广州510520 [2]广东工业大学经济与贸易学院,广东广州510520

出　　处：《广东工业大学学报》2015年第3期46-50,共5页Journal of Guangdong University of Technology

基　　金：广东省人文社科规划项目(11Y39);广东省普通高校人文社科项目(11WYXM022);中国博士后科学基金资助课题(2014M552177)

摘　　要：供应链上成员企业的研发(R&D)活动是实现供应链利润最大化的重要途径.本文从政府补贴背景下的制造商与供应商R&D合作与竞争策略选择的角度建立演化博弈模型,分析供应商、制造商及政府策略的动态演化过程及稳定状态.理论分析和数值模拟仿真结果表明:供应链上下游企业及政府之间的演化博弈存在唯一的演化稳定策略;由于供应链上下游企业R&D合作时的收益大于R&D竞争时的收益,制造商与供应商均选择R&D合作策略,政府则选择不补贴,这种情况是政府期望的系统演化方向.R＆D activity of members in supply chain is an important way to achieve the maximum profits of the supply chain.Under the background of the government subsidies, viewing the strategy selection of R＆D competition and cooperation between manufactures and suppliers, an evolutionary game model is es-tablished to analyze the dynamic evolution process and the steady state of suppliers, manufacturers and government.Theoretical analysis and numerical simulation results show that： Firstly, there is a unique evolutionary stable strategy between the upstream＆downstream enterprises in supply chain and the gov-ernment.Attracted by the more benefits from R＆D cooperation in supply chain, R＆D cooperation is the best strategy of manufacturers and suppliers.And “no subsidies” strategy is the best choice of the gov-ernment, which is the expected evolution direction of the government.

关 键 词：R&D策略 供应链 三群体演化博弈 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]