央地政府在压覆矿产资源管理中的博弈研究  

Game for Management of Constructed-over Mineral Resources Between Central and Local Governments

作　　者：高伟明[1] 曹庆仁[1] 宋学锋[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221116

出　　处：《资源开发与市场》2015年第11期1307-1310,共4页Resource Development & Market

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(编号:71173216);江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划项目(编号:CXLX13_0961)

摘　　要：压覆矿产资源管理涉及中央政府、地方政府的利益诉求,影响着国家资源战略和地方经济建设发展,问题十分复杂。运用"双重任务委托代理"模型,从压覆矿产资源管理的大局着眼,结合地方经济建设,对中央政府和地方政府在压覆矿产资源管理中存在的博弈进行分析。结果表明,地方政府对压覆矿产资源管理工作的重视程度受到风险规避特征(ρ)、工作风险程度(σ)、努力成本系数(β)、努力绩效系数(m)的影响,因此提出央地政府在压覆矿产资源管理中的对策和建议。Constructed - over mineral resources management related to the central government and local government interests, affected the nation- al resource strategy and the local economic and construction development, the problem was very complicated, this paper used ＂double tasks principal - agent model＂ to analyze the games between the central government and local government in the constructed- over mineral resources management, where the interest of central government was to develop the natural resource to its optimal level, but local govemment intended to safeguard the local economic and construction. The results showed that the efforts level of the local government in constructed - over mineral resources management work levelled by risk aversion（ρ）, working degree of risk（σ）, effort cost coefficient influence（β） and work hard coefficient（m）. Finally, this paper put for- ward the countermeasures and suggestions of the central and local government in the constructed - over mineral resources management.

关 键 词：压覆 矿产资源管理 中央政府 地方政府 委托代理模型 

分 类 号：F062.1[经济管理—政治经济学] F205