基于信号博弈的大气污染防治机制研究  

Mechanism of Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution Based on Signaling Game

作　　者：谢伟[1] 孙绍荣[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《资源开发与市场》2015年第11期1311-1313,1400,共4页Resource Development & Market

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(编号:71171134);上海市教委科研创新重点项目(编号:11ZS138);上海市一流学科建设项目(编号:S1201YLXK)

摘　　要：建立大气污染防治过程中政府与企业之间的信号博弈模型,考虑国内不同区域的发展特色各异,治污水平不同、涉及污染排放的企业规模和数量不同,以及政府与企业之间的信息不对称,分别探讨大气污染治理过程中可能存在的三种不同治污效率的贝叶斯均衡状态。结果表明,处于不同均衡状态下的政府对企业的污染气体排放的声明会采用不同策略,其治污效率有所不同。This paper used game theory to establish the signaling game model between government and enterprises in the process of the control of air pollution. Considering different regions for different development characteristics and different pollution level, and different number and size of enterprises involving pollution emissions, and the information asymmetry, respectively discussed the atmospheric pollution control process of the three different pollution treatment efficiency of Bayesian equilibrium. The results showed that government under different equilibrium state would adopt different strategies for enterprise pollution emissions statement, and would get different pollution treatment efficiency.

关 键 词：大气污染 信号博弈 信息不对称 

分 类 号：X51[环境科学与工程—环境工程]