再生资源补贴调控下的再生企业激励对策探究——基于委托代理行为分析  

Research on regeneration enterprise incentive measures under the control of renewable resources subsidies based on principal-agent theory

作　　者：张印贤[1] 郭汉丁[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津城建大学经济与管理学院,天津300384

出　　处：《再生资源与循环经济》2015年第9期13-17,共5页Recyclable Resources and Circular Economy

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目:废旧电器回收再生利用产业链主体责任分配机理及其协同机制研究(11YJA630203);教育部人文社会科学研究项目:废旧电器回收再生利用产业链主体激励模型及政策研究--基于价格协同视角(10YJA630046)

摘　　要：我国实施废旧电器回收再生利用补贴和市场准入制度,旨在促进废旧电器回收再生利用生态产业健康发展。废旧电器回收再生利用产业具有基于市场准入的技术壁垒所形成的非完全竞争性、固定补贴费率和综合效益目标的基本特征,存在着逆向选择、道德风险和X-无效率的产业运行问题,其本质是以资源再生补贴调控为手段的特许经营市场治理,通过确定补贴费率上限下的政府管理部门与再生企业委托代理分析,揭示政府管理部门与再生企业的行为博弈策略,从产业发展有效性出发,选择再生企业激励路径,提出优化契约设计、搭建竞争平台、实行分配限制、强化信誉价值等引导再生生态化处理废旧电器的产业持续发展激励对策。To promote the healthy development of the waste recycling and reuse eco-industries, the subsidies and market access system are implemented. The industry has some basis features including imperfect competition in technology barriers of the market access, fixed rate subsidies and overall efficiency target, which cause a series of problems, such as adverse selection, moral hazard, X-inefficiency, but the essence of the industry is the franchising- management based on the control of renewable resources subsidies. The principal-agent of the government departments and recyclers enterprise was analyzed by determining the upper limit of subsidy rates, and revealed the behavior strategy game. Finally, from the industrial development effectiveness and enterprise incentive regeneration process, the paper put forward some suggestions, such as designing optimal contract, introducing competition mechanism, restrictive distribution system, strengthen the credibility of the incentive effect, to guided regeneration ecological treatment of industrial waste electrical and sustainable development.

关 键 词：废旧电器 再生补贴 产业特征 运行问题 委托代理 激励对策 

分 类 号：F713.2[经济管理—产业经济]