区域财政支出协调机制的联盟博弈分析——以全要素生产率增长为目标  

Ananalysis of the coordination mechanism of fiscal expenditure with coalitional game for the total amount of the growth of the total factor productivity

作　　者：苏洪[1,2] 刘渝琳[3] 吴颖[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆师范大学经济与管理学院,重庆401331 [3]重庆大学公共管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》2015年第5期9-15,共7页Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"国际国内新形势下财政政策取向研究--基于财政支出体系完善与区域协调增长的双目标选择"(09XJY034)

摘　　要：中国经济增长质量的两个关键问题是全要素生产率(TFP)的增长和区域经济的总体协调发展。本文结合区域非合作与合作的两种动力机制分析,使用联盟博弈分析工具,探讨了如何安排财政支出协调机制来实现对地方保护和市场分割问题的解决路径,从而通过区域合作达到推动总量TFP增长的目标,实现经济增长质量的提升和经济增长的可持续性。There are two important problems about the quality of China＇ s economic growth. One is the total factor productivity （TFP） growth; the other is the coordination of the development of regional economy. This paper analyzes dynamic mechanism of regional non-cooperation and cooperation with coalitional game. In the following, this paper discusses how to arrange the coordination mechanism of fiscal expenditure to achieve the solution problem of local protection and market segmentation. In the end, this paper suggests using coordination mechanism of fiscal expenditure to promote regional cooperation, the quality of economic growth, the growth of total TFP, and achieve sustainable economic growth .

关 键 词：全要素生产率 财政支出 联盟博弈 

分 类 号：F207[经济管理—国民经济] F812.4