财政分权、政绩考核力度与地方政府公共财政支出偏好  

Fiscal Decentralization,Performance Examination and the Preference of Public Finance Expenditure of Local Governments

作　　者：郑延冰 

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院研究生院,北京102488

出　　处：《湖北经济学院学报》2015年第5期64-69,共6页Journal of Hubei University of Economics

摘　　要：尽管晋升锦标赛理论在解释我国地方政府的财政支出偏好方面具有较强的说服力,但也面临不少批评。作为对锦标赛理论的一个有益补充,本文以中央与地方政府间契约关系为出发点,在Holmstrom和Milgrom(1991)的框架下,构建了一个多任务委托代理模型,说明地方政府在这种契约关系下,可能将有限的财政资源投向那些能够相对准确度量和中央考核力度大的任务上面去。这一趋势会随着财政分权程度的增加而得到加强。Although promotion tournament mechanism is persuasive in explaining the preference of the expenditure structure of local governments, it is also criticized much. As a compensation to promotion tournament mechanism, based on the job of Holmstrom Milgrom（1991）, this paper constructs a multi-tasks principal- agent model by taking the performance examination into consideration to demonstrate that the local government could devote the limited fiscal resources to the items of expenditure that could be measured precisely and examined strongly, and this trend could be strengthened as the improving of fiscal decentralization.

关 键 词：晋升锦标赛 财政分权 政治集权 财政支出偏好 

分 类 号：F202[经济管理—国民经济]