保险中介市场规制的理论基础  

Theoretical Basis of Insurance Intermediary Market Regulation

作　　者：罗建原[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学管理科学与工程博士后流动站,湖北武汉430070 [2]天安财产保险股份有限公司,上海200120

出　　处：《保险职业学院学报》2015年第5期17-20,共4页Journal of Insurance Professional College

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70971104);(71372201)

摘　　要：博弈论解释了保险中介市场上诸多主体之间博弈行为无处不在;成本交易理论详解了经济交易过程机理;委托-代理理论是保险中介市场政策的分析工具;制度经济学是构建保险中介市场制度的理论基础;政府公共利益理论是对保险中介市场失灵的回应,弥补了自由市场分析不足;系统系理论是纳入不确定性因素的分析框架,强调以市场治理等方式,激发保险中介市场的积极涌现效应,而制约消极涌现;上述理论各有侧重并相互融合,共同构建了保险中介市场规制的理论基础。This paper builds the theoretical basis of insurance intermediary market regulation （IIMR）. Game theory shows the scene that game behavior takes place everywhere in the insurance inter- mediary market. Transaction cost theory explains the mechanism of the economic transactions on the mi- cro level. Principal--agent theory provides an analysis tool for making policy of insurance intermediary market. Institutional economics is the theoretical basis of constructing the system of insurance interme- diary market. Public interest theory of government regulation makes up for the deficiency of free market analysis. Theory of System of Systems proposes that the integrated performance of the insurance inter- mediary market is the result of interaction among participants. These theories have different emphasis and together build the theory basis of the research on IIMR.

关 键 词：保险中介 政府规制 信息不确定性 道德风险 逆向选择 系统系 

分 类 号：F840.4[经济管理—保险]