银行与物流企业的博弈与演化分析  

Game Theoretical and Evolutionary Analysis of Bank and Logistic Firms

作　　者：梁椋 王冀宁[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京工业大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京211800

出　　处：《南京工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2015年第3期123-128,共6页Journal of Nanjing Tech University：Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家软科学研究计划项目(2012GXS4D115);教育部规划基金资助项目(10YJA790183);江苏省社会科学基金项目(09EYB010)

摘　　要：基于现阶段我国存货质押融资业务的特点,构建银行与物流企业间的委托模型,分析物流企业和银行博弈的纳什均衡策略,在此基础上,运用演化博弈理论构建物流企业与银行的演化博弈模型,研究物流企业与银行在存货质押融资业务中的策略选择的互动机制。结果表明:物流企业与银行在一次博弈中的纳什均衡为(诚信,不监督),在动态演化博弈系统中则存在两个演化稳定策略,分别是(诚信,不监督)和(不诚信,监督)。当初值位于不同区域时,系统将收敛于不同的均衡点,这表明初值对系统的演化结果有着显著的影响。Based on the present stage of the characteristics of our country＇s stock pledge financing business,this paper presents static game model between logistic firms and bank,and evolutionary game models with logistic firms＇ trust strategy and bank＇s supervision strategy to analyze the interactive mechanism of financing strategy selection of bank and logistic firms. Using the evolutionary game theory to construct the evolutionary game model of logistics enterprises and banks,it is concluded that Nash equilibrium（ sincerity,non supervision） exists in static game,and there are two evolutionary stable strategies（ sincerity,non supervision） and（ bad faith,supervision） in the dynamic evolutionary game model. When the original values are located in different areas,the system will converge to different equilibrium points,which indicates that the initial value of parameter has a significant impact on the system＇s direction.

关 键 词：博弈均衡 演化博弈 银行 物流企业 融资企业 

分 类 号：F25[经济管理—国民经济]