森林旅游企业环境行为的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Environmental Behavior of Forest Tourism Enterprises

作　　者：林秀治[1] 黄秀娟[1] 

机构地区：[1]福建农林大学管理学院,福州350002

出　　处：《林业经济问题》2015年第5期447-451,共5页Issues of Forestry Economics

基　　金：福建省科技厅软科学研究计划项目(2013R0013)

摘　　要：运用演化博弈理论构建了森林旅游企业环境行为的演化博弈模型,指出政府进行环境监管的概率与成本、对森林旅游企业实施的惩罚、森林旅游企业因实施环境行为为自身带来的收益及所花费的成本是影响森林旅游企业环境行为演化的主要因素,并在此基础上提出了加大政府政策扶持、建立森林旅游生态补偿机制、完善森林旅游环境监管体制、制定合理的奖罚制度等促进森林旅游企业实施环境行为的政策建议。Using evolutionary game theory,this article constructs evolutionary game model of environmental behavior of forest tourism enterprises,notes that the probability and cost of government environmental regulation,penalties on the forest tourism enterprises,benefits and cost due to the implementation of environmental behavior are the factors in influencing the environmental behavior evolution of forest tourism enterprises. Based on this,this article puts forward the suggestions for promoting the environmental behavior of forest tourism enterprises such as increasing government policy support,establishing ecological compensation mechanism of forest tourism,perfecting the supervision system of forest tourist environment,formulating a reasonable system of reward and punishment and so on.

关 键 词：森林旅游 企业环境行为 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F590.7[经济管理—旅游管理]