实验市场中的审计博弈与审计质量——审计师声誉和企业内部监督的比较制度实验研究  

Audit Game and Audit Quality in an Experimental Market:A Comparative Institutional Experiment on Auditor Reputation and Internal Supervision

作　　者：李建标[1,2] 殷西乐 任雪 

机构地区：[1]南开大学中国公司治理研究院,天津300071 [2]南开大学商学院,天津300071 [3]国网英大国际控股集团有限公司财务资产部,北京100005

出　　处：《财经研究》2015年第10期132-144,共13页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71372094;71132001;71172068;71533002)

摘　　要：为考察审计参与人的博弈过程及其结果,文章构建了涉及管理者和审计师等局中人的博弈模型,在此基础上引入审计师声誉机制和内部监督机制,利用比较制度实验经济学的方法对比了两种机制对管理者和审计师行为的影响及其对审计质量的改善效果。研究发现:(1)基准实验中管理者更多地选择较高的舞弊水平,而审计师更多地选择较高的审计力度,实现了福利水平最劣的均衡结果;(2)偏好性的声誉机制对审计质量的改善效果不显著,内部监督机制从根本上减少了舞弊的发生,显著地改善了审计质量;(3)审计力度在内部监督机制与审计质量之间存在完全中介效应。文章对于如何通过治理机制来有效地提高审计质量具有一定的参考价值。To investigate the game process and results between different audit agents,this paper constructs a game model involving a manager and an auditor,introduces auditor reputation mechanism and internal supervision mechanism,and compares the effects of these two mechanisms on the behavior of managers and auditors and their role in the improvement of audit quality by comparative institutional experiment economics.It arrives at the conclusions as follows：firstly,in the benchmark experiment,managers are more inclined to select high-level fraud and auditors are more inclined to high-degree audit,realizing the equilibrium of the worst welfare results;secondly,preference-based reputation mechanism plays a poor role in the improvement of audit quality,and internal supervision system plays a fundamental role in the reduction in the occurrence of fraud,thereby significantly improving audit quality;thirdly,audit strength has a mediating effect on the relationship between internal supervision mechanism and audit quality.It provides certain reference for effective improvement of audit quality through governance mechanisms.

关 键 词：审计质量 声誉 内部监督 比较制度实验 中介效应 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]