独立监事制度有效吗?——来自中国上市公司的实证证据  

Is the Independent Supervisor System Effective?——Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：蔡竞[1] 许楠[2] 董艳[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学经济与管理研究院 [2]西南财经大学会计学院

出　　处：《投资研究》2015年第6期46-65,共20页Review of Investment Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目71203183的资助

摘　　要：本文利用2003年-2012年中国上市公司数据,从公司或高管违法违规行为、是否聘请四大会计师事务所和关联交易的角度,对独立监事的引入效果进行实证研究。研究发现,引入独立监事的上市公司中公司或高管违法违规行为显著减少、聘请四大会计师事务所进行审计的概率显著增加、关联交易的金额减少但不显著;同时独立监事的引入促进了监事会、独立董事发挥监督作用。本文的研究发现为中国上市公司引入独立监事制度提供了支持依据。Using an unbalanced dataset of Chinese listed companies from year 2003 to 2012, we empirically investigate the ef- fectiveness of introducing independent supervisors. By taking violation behaviors of the executives or the company, whether hiring top four accounting firms and related transactions as our research subjects, we find that the independent supervisors not on- ly play a supervisory role by itself： significantly strengthening the supervision on violation behaviors and reinforcing the hire of the top four accounting firms, reducing the occurrence of related transactions insignificantly; but also improve the supervi- sion efficiency of supervisors and independent directors. The findings provide support to introduce an independent supervisor system in Chinese listed companies.

关 键 词：监事会 独立监事 独立董事 监督效率 

分 类 号：F233[经济管理—会计学] F271[经济管理—国民经济]