基于讨价还价能力的双渠道供应链批发价谈判模式  

Wholesale Price Bargaining Modes in the Dual-channel Supply Chain under Bargaining Power

作　　者：李海[1] 崔南方[2] 徐贤浩[2] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学工商管理学院,湖北武汉430073 [2]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2015年第4期124-132,共9页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271097);国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71131004)

摘　　要：针对由网络直销渠道和零售渠道组成的双渠道供应链进行研究。首次在双渠道供应链的背景下研究了批发价谈判模式问题。基于批发价协商过程中谈判方的讨价还价能力,得出了供应链成员的价格均衡决策。综合考虑零售商和制造商之间的谈判能力对比和顾客对渠道的偏好度,对比分析了不同批发价谈判模式下的制造商利润、零售商利润和供应链利润。研究表明,在零售价不可观测情形下,批发价谈判模式的选择对制造商的利润影响并不显著,但对零售商利润和供应链利润的影响较大。在多数情况下,制造商弱偏好于以零售商的零售价为谈判基准,零售商则偏好于以制造商的直销价为谈判基准。以制造商的直销价为谈判基准有可能成为双方均可接受的最优均衡谈判模式。而在零售价可观测的情形下,当渠道价格替代系数较大时,利润对比分析的变化趋势与零售价不可观测情形基本一致。而当渠道价格替代系数较小时,批发价谈判模式选择相对复杂。With the rapid development of Internet and logistics, shopping online today has become a popular consumption pattern. Due to the high demand in online channels, more and more manufacturers begin to adopt the dual-channel strategy, including traditional retail channel and online direct channel, to distribute their products. On the other hand, the retail market is increasingly dominated by a few large retailers such as chain supermarkets. For example, Walmart is one of the biggest companies all over the world and achieved $285 billion sales in 2005. In China, Suning and Gomei are also well known for their huge market share in the retail market. In this situation, the manufacturer can＇t make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to these dominant retailers. The wholesale price is often the result of the bargaining process between manufacturer and retailer. In the dual channel supply chain, the wholesale price also depends on the bargaining power between manufacturer and retailer.While most of the extant work assumes that wholesale price is determined by the manufacturer pursuing profit maximization, this paper is the first to investigate the wholesale price bargaining mode in the dual channel supply chain. Based on the bargaining power of negotiators in the wholesale price negotiation, we derive the equilibrium pricing decision made by supply chain members. In addition, in the section of numerical analysis, only one parameter（i.e., cross-price sensitivity） is required. This makes our numerical analysis results robust and generalized. This study analyzes and compares both bargaining power and customers＇ preference of channel, manufacturer profit, retailer profit and supply chain profit under different wholesale price bargaining modes.. The study results are summarized as follows. Considering the case that retail price is unobservable, the manufacturer＇s profit under wholesale price negotiation adopting retail price as benchmark is higher than the manufacturer＇s profit under wholesale price negotiation adopting dire

关 键 词：双渠道供应链 讨价还价能力 批发价谈判模式 定价 

分 类 号：F713[经济管理—产业经济]