基于讨价还价理论的企业集团中的利益分配  

Benefit Distribution of Industrial Group Based on the Bargaining Theory

作　　者：杨哲[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学经济学院,上海200433

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2015年第4期140-144,共5页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家社科基金西部资助项目(09XJL008);教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目(09YJC790281)

摘　　要：本文构建一个简单的企业集团组建模型,利用讨价还价理论,分析企业集团组建过程中的利益分配问题。分别利用Nash讨价还价理论和Rubinstein讨价还价理论,得出企业集团组建中的各种利益分配形式以及使其成立的条件,其中重点分析了不同成员对讨价还价过程的耐受程度。最后给出算例验证其可行性。The formation of enterprise groupshave always been animportant part in the research ofindustrial organization.Based on the game theory and experimental economics, scholars analyzed the causes of formation of enterprise group, the process of formation of enterprise groupand various policiestoensure the formation of enterprise group. Current literature lacks of research on the distribution of benefits among members after enterprise groups are formed.Thus, the theme of our paper is the distribution of benefits among members after enterprise groupshave been established. In this paper,our main research toolsare the Nash bargaining theory and the Rubinsteinbargaining theory. Before analyzing the distribution of benefits among membersin the process offormation of enterprise group, some principles must begiven：（a） after the formation of enterprise group, their profit is greater than sum of profit of both forms when it comes to its own profit;（b） the assigned profit of each enterprise cannot be lower than their own profit;（c） the form of bargaining isa turning process, and there is a tolerance level on both sides.In the process of enterprise group formation,the distribution of benefits among members can be abstracted as the bargaining model.Bargaining theory has been a very perfect theory system, which is animportant tool to solve the problem of profit distribution.Nash bargaining theory is uses mathematical analysis based on the axiomatic system. However, interactive Rubinstein bargaining is more common and more realistic situationin the real life. In the distribution of benefit among members, companies will need to propose their own scheme, and confront the long bargaining process, until getting a distribution form, which iseventually satisfied by both sides.Here, we assume that Enterprise 1 firstly proposesa scheme （π0^＊-x,x）, and Enterprise 2 decides whether to accept the schedume. If Enterprise 2accepts the scheme, the bargaining process ends; if Enterprise 2 does not accept the scheme, it will p

关 键 词：企业集团 利益分配 Nash讨价还价 Rubinstein讨价还价 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学] F224.32