考虑策略型消费者双层因素的多零售商动态博弈定价  被引量:15

Dynamic Pricing Game among Multi-retailers Considering Two Factors of Strategic Consumers

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作  者:陈晓红[1] 谭运强 

机构地区:[1]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083

出  处:《管理工程学报》2015年第4期178-185,共8页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基  金:国家自然科学基金创新群体科学基金资助项目(70921001/G0104;2010-2015);国家自然科学基金国际(地区)合作与交流资助项目(71210003)

摘  要:在多零售商的动态博弈定价过程中,考虑策略型消费者的比例q和降价时购买的比例r这两层因素具有重要的现实意义。将消费者分为策略型和短视型,建立了多零售商间价格战博弈的基本模型,证明了多零售商间价格战博弈均衡的存在。然后对模型进行讨论,分析了多零售商之间价格战的动态博弈定价过程,以及价格p、r和q对零售商的需求量和利润的影响。最后以三个零售商为例进行数值分析和验证。结论表明,多零售商之间的动态博弈定价存在最优组合策略,零售商的价格战应适可而止;随着策略型消费者的比例越高,零售商之间博弈的定价水平和利润水平就越高,但是零售商的需求量的改变幅度会变小,市场需求越稳定,零售商之间的价格战程度会减弱;而当策略型消费者降价购买的概率增大时,结论则相反。这为国内零售商的价格博弈竞争提供了决策参考。With the rapid development of Internet and electronic commerce, the circulation and communicationchannels of information are more diverse. Abundant and rich information reduce the information asymmetry between retailers and consumers, which increases the number of strategic consumers under the electronic commerce environment. As the domestic retail market(especially the retail market on emerginge-commerce platform) has not yet been fullymatured and stabled, many retailers, especially those new entrants or those who occupy certain superiorities,often choose to launch a price warin a competition. But the experiences and lessons of the past and present show that althoughlaunching a price war can increase market share in the short term, it is also a double-edged sword. If it cannot be reasonably utilized, it would bring disastrous consequences to retailers.In face of this situation, the domestic retailers have fallen into a dilemma. On the one hand, inan immaturecompetitivemarket, in order to compete for marketdemand,price wars amongretailersareinevitable, which has brought new challenges to the dynamic pricing game among multi-retailers(DPGAMR). Therefore, in the process of DPGAMR, it has important practical significance toconsidertwo factors of the ratio of strategic consumers "θ " and their proportion of the purchase "ρ" under the price cut.Through the derivation and discussion of the model and numerical analysis, the impact of price "p", "ρ", and "θ" on DPGAMR are analyzed. First, with consumers regarded as either strategic consumers or myopicconsumers,the basic model of DPGAMR is established and its existence of equilibrium is proved. Then the model is further discussed, and the process of DPGAMR and the effect of p,ρ, and θ on retailers' demand and profits are analyzed. Finally, the numerical simulation is carried out and confirmed with examples of three retailers.The conclusions show that, there exists an optimal portfolio strategy in DPGAMR, and retailers' price war shoul

关 键 词:多零售商 策略型消费者 动态博弈定价 价格战 

分 类 号:C934[经济管理—管理学]

 

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