TPL服务商参与决策的生鲜农产品三级供应链协调机制  

Coordination in a Three-echelon Supply Chain of Fresh Agri-products with TPLSP's Participation in Decision-making

作　　者：冯颖[1] 余云龙[1] 张炎治[1] 吴茜[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221116

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2015年第4期213-221,共9页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71101147);中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(20110491477);江苏省博士后科研基金资助计划(1101111C);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2013W12)

摘　　要：针对供应商、TPL服务商和零售商组成的生鲜农产品三级供应链,建立了确定性需求情形下,供应商主导的物流服务水平影响市场需求的三方竞合博弈模型。研究表明,引入物流服务成本分担契约和物流服务数量折扣契约,可同时协调物流服务水平和零售价格,但参数需满足供应商批发价格低于生产成本。考虑到供应商利润非负,进一步引入收入共享契约将零售商收入的一部分共享给供应商,从而协调供应链三方成员的决策。然后,在供应商批发价格为内生变量的情形下,采用纳什讨价还价模型确定了最优的批发价格。最后,对收入共享系数和常态运输价格进行了灵敏度分析,发现当收入共享系数满足特定条件时,供应链实现帕累托改善。Considering a three-echelon supply chain consisting of a supplier, a TPLSP（TPL service provider）, and a retailer, this paper develops a supplier-led game model under the condition that customer demand is deterministic with logistics service level affecting demand. In this model, the supplier who acts as a leader is responsible for the production of fresh agri-products, while the TPLSP and the retailer, acting as followers, can make decision simultaneously. The TPLSP undertakes the transport-and-preservation task and delivers products from the supplier to the retailer. Moreover, the retailer delivers transport fare to the TPLSP and satisfies the terminal market demand. In summary, the system includes three decision variables, including the supplier＇s wholesale price, the TPLSP＇s logistics service level, and the retailer＇s retail price.Our research shows that the optimal logistics service level and order quantity in the decentralized decision mode without contracts are lower than the corresponding results in the centralized one which results in the loss of the chain＇s profit. A logistics service cost sharing contract is that logistics service cost is shared by the TPLSP and the retailer, and a linear logistics service quantity discount contract is used. We assume that the transport price is the linear function of the retailer＇s order quantity. It has been proved that these two contracts can coordinate both the logistics service level and the retail price. However, the supplier＇s wholesale price is lower than its production cost per item in this case. Assuming that the supplier＇s profit is non-negative, we further introduce a revenue sharing contract between the supplier and the retailer into the model. The contract can effectively avoid the non-reasonable case occurring at the supplier. It has been proved that the combination of the abovementioned three contracts can perfectly coordinate this chain and Pareto improvement can be achieved when the revenue sharing coefficient satisfies certain condit

关 键 词：TPL服务商 生鲜农产品 三级供应链 竞合博弈 协调机制 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]