VIE模式双重道德风险及监管建议  

Dual Moral Hazards Inherent in VIE Structure and Regulatory Suggestions

作　　者：刘纪鹏[1] 林蔚然[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国政法大学,北京100088

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2015年第10期4-12,共9页Securities Market Herald

摘　　要：VIE模式作为中概股登陆海外资本市场的主要方式,产生的主要原因是国内股票发行与海外直接上市的高门槛。VIE模式帮助大量中国高科技企业在发展关口融得资金,但由于该模式主要是通过协议而非传统的股权来实现对境内企业的控制,使其成为上市模式的另类。本文通过大量的案例分析,指出VIE模式所独具的双重道德风险。鉴于VIE模式尚且存在一定的现实需要,本文指出在监管模式上,证监会应一方面加大披露力度,让外国投资者切实了解到VIE模式的风险,另一方面拓宽境内境外的融资渠道,让VIE模式真正成为一个历史称谓。VIE structure, which is the main way that Chinese enterprises adopt to be listed in overseas financial markets, is rooted in the high thresholds both for IPO at home and for listing directly overseas. The VIE structure makes it possible for many Chinese enterprises to raise funds, but because in this way the listed companies controls the enterprises at home through contracts, which should be equity in traditional way, the structure becomes special. This article systemically analyzes the risks of VIE structure through the recent cases and proposes that the moral hazard is doubled in the structure. In final, the article points out that the double moral hazards problem could not be solved by the methods put forward by foreign investment laws. Under such circumstances, CRSC, working together with SEC, should strengthen the disclosure of the risks of the VIE. In the meanwhile, the regulators should make it more convenient for enterprises to finance no matter at home or overseas so that the VIE structure will be not preferred d in the future.

关 键 词：VIE模式 双重委托代理 道德风险 

分 类 号：DF438[政治法律—经济法学]