基于收益博弈理论的水利工程质量监督研究  

Study on quality supervision of hydraulic engineering based on Game theory

作　　者：刘春阳[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京市水利基本建设工程质量监督中心站,100038

出　　处：《北京水务》2015年第5期36-38,共3页Beijing Water

摘　　要：结合工作实际,指出水利工程建设过程实际上就是质量监督机构与工程参建单位收益博弈过程。通过前提、参数假设,建立了质量监督机构与工程参建单位的收益博弈矩阵,并且对收益博弈策略、监督力度与惩罚力度进行分析研究,得出结论。对当前水利工程质量监督存在的问题进行了剖析,提出了推动机构职能改革、加强诚信体系建设、健全法律法规的对策与建议。In this paper, combined with the actual work, it is pointed out that process of Hydraulic Engineering construction, in fact, is a profit game process between the quality supervision institution and and engineering construction units. Through making hypothesis of premise, parameter, the matrix of earning game was established between the quality supervision institutions and engineering units. The earnings game strategy, supervision and punishment were analyzed, and drew a conclusion. Finally, the current problems exist in quality supervision of hydraulic engineering was analyzed. To promote the reform of institutions function, strengthen the integrity system, improve laws and regulations, some countermeasures and suggestions were proposed.

关 键 词：水利工程 质量监督 收益博弈 

分 类 号：TV512[水利工程—水利水电工程]