零售商资金约束的多渠道供应链定价策略  

Pricing Strategy of Multi-channel Supply Chain with Retailer's Capital Constraint

作　　者：李凯[1] 陈卫华[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110819 [2]沈阳华晨宝马汽车有限公司,辽宁沈阳110143

出　　处：《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》2015年第10期1511-1515,共5页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172150;71472032)

摘　　要：研究了考虑零售商面临资金约束条件下的多零售商组成的多渠道供应链模型中的定价策略问题.根据零售商资金状况不同,利用Stackelberg与Bertrand博弈理论分析资金充足与不足条件下的供应链上下游关系,给出了制造商与零售商各自定价决策行为,分析定价决策行为对供应链各成员绩效的影响.数值模拟结果表明,在资金充足条件下,制造商可以获得最高收益,而零售商获得较低收益;在资金不足条件下,与银行借贷策略相比,制造商和零售商利用推迟支付策略可以使双方获得更高收益;在资金约束条件下的多零售商组成的多渠道供应链,推迟支付策略仍是最优定价决策.A pricing strategy of multi-channels supply chain model was studied with many retailers and capital constraint.According to the difference of retailer＇s capital condition,the relationship between supply chain upstream and downstream was analyzed by using the Stackelberg and Bertrand game theory.The pricing decision-making strategies of the manufacturer and the retailers were given,and the supply chain member＇s performances were analyzed under the different pricing decision-making strategies.The results showed that the manufacturer can get the highest profit and the retailer can get a lower profit under sufficient funds condition.Comparing with the loan-payment strategy,the manufacturer and the retailers can both gain more profit by the deferred-payment strategy under insufficient funds condition.The deferred-payment strategy is the best decision-making for the supply chain channel under capital constraint.

关 键 词：资金约束 STACKELBERG 博弈 Bertrand 博弈 多零售商 多渠道 银行借贷策略 推迟支付策略 

分 类 号：TP274[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]