流域污染治理中政企合谋现象研究  

Collusion between the government and the enterprise in pollution management

作　　者：蒋丹璐[1] 曹国华[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆科技学院工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2015年第5期584-593,共10页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：重庆科技学院校内科研基金资助项目(ck20131326);教育部新世纪优秀人才资助项目(NCET-07-0905)

摘　　要：用随机微分对策方法研究流域生态补偿机制作用下地方政府减排政策的制定问题.通过分析上游地方政府和企业间的Stackelberg博弈和合作博弈的纳什均衡,发现政企合谋现象是一种纳什均衡.由于政企合谋现象会严重影响地方污染治理工作效率,分析了地方政府具有选择政企合谋策略的内在动因是信息不对称和利益差别,最后,提出了避免政企合谋的政策建议.By the method of stocahastic differential game, this paper studies pollution reduction decision problems of the local government under the influence of river basin ecological compensation mechanism. Through the analysis of the Nash equilibrium ofa Stackelberg game and a cooperation game between the upstream area local government and the enterprise, it is found that the collusion phenomenon is a kind of Nash equilibrium. Because the collusion phenomenon can seriously impact the local pollution control eflficiency, the intrinsic rea- sons of collusion are analyzed. The result shows that such reasons lie in information asymmetry and benefit difference. Finally, some policy suggestions are put forward to overcome this collusion problem.

关 键 词：随机微分对策 STACKELBERG博弈 合作博弈 政企合谋 流域生态补偿 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]