导游服务供应商竞争下服务外包激励契约设计  

Design of incentive contracts for service outsourcing under competition between two tour-guide service suppliers

作　　者：罗定提[1] 章江顺 鲁芳[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南工业大学管理科学与工程研究所,湖南株洲412007

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2015年第5期682-692,共11页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71201053);湖南工业大学研究生创新基金资助项目(CX1417)

摘　　要：针对旅行社易对单一导游服务供应商产生依赖及导游服务质量低下等问题,以旅行社将导游服务业务发包给两个具有竞争关系的导游服务供应商为前提,运用委托代理理论分别设计了有无奖惩机制两种情况下的导游服务外包契约,并比较分析了两种契约下的最优激励参数.研究发现在线性分成机制基础上增设奖惩机制,可有效提升导游服务外包系统产出并缓解导游服务质量及游客满意度低下等问题,线性分成机制与奖惩机制之间在激励效能上具有互补性.最后,通过数值仿真分析了基于竞争关系及奖惩机制下导游服务外包激励契约的有效性.Considering the travel agencies＇ problem of relying on the single supplier providing with tourguide service as well as the guides＇ problem of low-quality service, with the assume of that the travel agencies award contract to two tour-guide service suppliers with competitive relationship as the prerequisite, based on the principal-agent theory, tour-guide service outsourcing incentive contracts with and without reward penalty mechanism are designed respectively, and the optimal incentive parameters under two kinds of contract are analyzed. Researches show that adding reward penalty mechanism on the basis of linear sharing mechanism can enhance system output of tour-guide service outsourcing and alleviate the problem of low-quality guiders＇ serves and tourists＇ satisfaction, and that the reward penalty mechanism and linear sharing mechanism are complementary in motivation effectiveness. Finally, a numerical example is used to confirm the effectiveness of the incentive contracts of tour-guide service outsourcing, based on the competitive relationship and reward penalty mechanism.

关 键 词：导游服务外包 激励契约设计 竞争关系 奖惩机制 

分 类 号：F224.3[经济管理—国民经济]