中小企业联保贷款的横向监督问题研究  

The Study of Peer Monitoring in Group Lending

作　　者：陈金龙[1] 倪晓芬[1] 

机构地区：[1]华侨大学工商管理学院,福建泉州362021

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2015年第19期1-11,共11页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金(12YJA630012);福建省自然科学基金(2011J01382);中央高校基本科研业务费(JB-SK1103)

摘　　要：联保贷款通过利用团体成员之间的信息优势和连带偿还责任机制,自发形成内部横向监督,以解决中小企业与银行之间的信息不对称所引起的道德风险问题.首先通过构建相应的横向监督分析模型,发现连带责任、再融资需求以及社会制裁会是影响横向监督的主要因素;然后讨论了不同监督模式下联保团体成员的横向监督问题,以及实现最优监督水平的条件,研究发现在联保团体成员同质情形下要提高有效监督水平可以采用相互监督模式,而联保团体成员异质情形下再融资需求越高的成员所付出的监督水平越大,选择这类成员担任联保组长时,可以有效提升监督水平,被监督企业发生策略性违约也将概率下降,银行与联保体的整体收益也将随之上升;最后探讨了促使这类成员为组长的激励机制.Group lending Overcomes moral hazard problem caused by information asymmetry between SMEs and banks,by information advantage and joint liability mechanism,which spontaneously form a structure of peer monitoring.This paper firstly constructs a model to analyze peer monitoring problems,and finds that joint liability,re-financing need and social sanctions are factors of the level of peer monitoring,and then discusses the peer monitoring under different monitoring models as well as conditions of the optimal level.When the group members are homogenous,mutual monitoring model can be used to heighten the level of peer monitoring.In the case of the heterogeneous group members,the member with greater re-financing need provides a higher level of monitoring,and if this member becomes the group leader,the effective monitoring increases,and the strategic default probability of the monitored enterprise declines.Finally this paper analyzes the incentive mechanism inducing such member to be the group leader.

关 键 词：中小企业 联保贷款 横向监督 搭便车 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学] F276.3