制度约束、部门利益与土地违法  

Institutional Constraints,Departmental Benefit and Illegal Activities on Land Use: Panel Data from China

作　　者：李隆伟[1] 杨蔚宁[1,2] 郭沛[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国农业大学中国农村政策研究中心,北京100083 [2]合肥师范学院经济与管理学院,安徽合肥230601

出　　处：《华南理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2015年第5期9-17,共9页Journal of South China University of Technology(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家发展改革委员会地区经济司2015年度社会公开征集课题<新经济常态下区域经济增长极核研究>资助

摘　　要：在分析土地违法制度约束与部门利益的基础上,探索土地违法行为的影响因素。在理论分析的基础上,建立多元线性回归模型。得出结论:1制度约束是影响土地违法的根本原因。2政府积极向企事业寻租,"鼓励"了企业土地违法行为。3地方政府为了追求政绩热衷追求GDP,使得政府参与土地违法。4严格控制土地出让方式,可以缓解土地违法行为发生。5土地违法现象不具有显著的地区效应。最后,提出建议:1健全土地产权体系,加强对土地违法的监管和查处力度。2改变地方政府政治晋升激励机制,改变以GDP作为衡量晋升的标准。3完善财政制度,提高各级地方政府财政预算的科学性,提高财政资金使用效率。4积极推进土地出让市场化改革,遏制土地违法行为。This paper,with institutional constraints and departmental interests,analyzes the influencing factors of illegal activities on land use. The conclusions are as follows： 1The root cause of illegal activities on land use is institutional constraints. 2The government diverts effort from stop forms of illegal using land to rent-seeking,thus encouraging the land illegal behavior of the enterprise. 3 Local governments are keen on GDP in pursuit of achievement,making the government involve in illegal land. 4Strict control of land transfer can ease the land illegal behavior. 5There are no significant regional difference effects in the illegal activities on land use. Finally it recommends： 1improve the land property right system; strengthen the supervision and investigation and punishment of illegal land. 2reform the political promotion incentive mechanism; not use GDP as a measure of the standard for promotion. 3improve the financial system,the local government budget scientifically,and efficiency in the use of fiscal funds. 4actively promote the land market reform to restrain illegal activities on land use.

关 键 词：制度约束 部门利益 土地违法 

分 类 号：F301[经济管理—产业经济]