主办银行:信息不对称下银企关系重构的选择  

Reconstruction of Bank & Enterprise Relationship under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：王冲[1] 郭琪[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行济南分行,山东济南250021

出　　处：《金融发展研究》2015年第10期3-10,共8页Journal Of Financial Development Research

基　　金：山东省社科规划重点研究项目<主办银行制度与市场化背景下的银企关系构建>(14CJRI05)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：当前国内部分地区企业资金链紧张,违约风险不断发酵,部分企业的授信风险正蔓延成区域风险,这些问题反映了当前基于"多对多"的普通银企关系的信贷管理制度的弊端。主办银行制度"一对一"的特点有利于构建稳定、排他、密切的银企关系,进而通过促进信息透明和稳定预期实现金融资源的优化配置和金融风险的有效防控。本文通过对1844家企业的实证分析,发现主办银行制度更适用于信息不对称程度较强的领域。因此,可以在信息不对称现象最为严重的中小微企业、三农领域率先实施,实现融资与增信的双促进。Currently, the fund chain of the domestic enterprises in some regions is rather tense, the default risk is constantly aggravating and the credit risk of some of the enterprise has spread into the regional risk. All these issues re- flect the current disadvantages of ordinary bank ＆ enterprise relationship based on the multiple credit management sys- tem. Main bank system＇s The ＂one to one＂ feature of the main bank system is conducive to build a stable, exclusive and close relationship between banks and enterprises. And then through the promotion of information transparency and expectation stability, it achieves an optimal allocation of financial resources and the effective prevention and control of financial risks. Through the empirical analysis of 1844 enterprises, the paper finds that as it has a better effect on the en- terprises with asymmetric information, the main bank system can be first implemented in the small, medium-sized and micro enterprises and three rural areas that are faced with the most serious information asymmetry issues so as to promote both financing and credit.

关 键 词：银企关系 信贷管理制度 主办银行 关系型融资 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]