投资银行与风险投资在IPO的定价:一个理论模型  

The Pricing of IPO by Investment Banks and Venture Capital: a Theoretical Model

作　　者：朱晖[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学经济与贸易学院

出　　处：《财会通讯（中）》2015年第10期3-6,129,共4页Communication of Finance and Accounting

基　　金：广东省教育部产学研结合项目"广东现代服务业公共支撑平台的开发与应用"(项目编号:2009B090200062)阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：风险资本家为参股企业提供监督服务和认证作用,能减少信息不对称,吸引更高质量的投资银行,使企业IPO时能确定更接近市场价格的发行价格,从而降低抑价。本文基于监督和认证假说,构建投资银行和风险资本的定价模型,解释投资银行及风险投资的定价机理和造成抑价的原因。The venture capitalists provide supervision and certification service for shareholding enterprises, which reduces the information asymmetry and attract more high quality investment banks. Thus, the price is close to the market price when the enterprise enters the market and under-pricing is avoided thereby. Based on the supervision and certification hypothesis, this paper builds a pricing model of investment banks and venture capital to explain the pricing mechanism of investment bank, investment risk pricing mechanism and the causes of underpricing.

关 键 词：投资银行 风险投资 定价 抑价 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学] F224