公私合作模式的农地整理项目投资分摊博弈  

Game of Investment Allocation in Agricultural Land Consolidation Projects Based on Public-private Partnership

作　　者：吴九兴[1] 徐凯旋[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽师范大学国土资源与旅游学院,安徽芜湖241002

出　　处：《贵州农业科学》2015年第10期220-223,227,共5页Guizhou Agricultural Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"基于过程的农地整理项目效率测度及效率提升机制研究"(71073065);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"农村宅基地有序退出机制研究"(14YJC630138);国家社会科学基金项目"粮食主产区农地整理项目农户参与机制研究"(12BGL078)

摘　　要：为公私合作模式的农地整理项目投资分摊实践提供理论参考,构建政府和企业合作的农地整理项目投资分摊博弈模型,并求解其均衡解。结果表明:为实现双方利益的均衡,政府可以选择高补贴或是低贴补,企业只能选择增大投资。政府的投资分摊结果主要受新增耕地面积、新增耕地价值、提高耕地质量和改善农村人居环境的正影响;企业的投资分摊结果分别受年经营收益的正影响和农地租赁成本与农地承包期的负影响;政府和企业的保留收益对其各自的投资积极性均有负影响。The investment allocation game model in agricultural land consolidation projects under government and enterprise partnership was established to provide a theoretical reference for investment allocation practice of agricultural land consolidation projects under the public-private partnership. Results. government can choose measures of high subsides or low subsides but enterprises only choose the measure of enlargement investment to realize the equilibrium of mutual interest. The government＇s investment allocation results are positively affected by newly increased agricultural acreage, newly increased agricultural value, improved agricultural quality and improved rural habitation environment. The enterprise＇s investment allocation results are positively affected by annual management income and negatively affected by land leasing cost and land contract period. The retained income has the negative effect on investment motivation of government and enterprises.

关 键 词：农地整理 公私合作 投资分摊 博弈 

分 类 号：S-9[农业科学] F301.2[经济管理—产业经济]