应急物资政企联合储备合作机理研究  

The Study of Cooperation Mechanism between Government and Enterprises in Emergency Supplies Reserve

作　　者：艾云飞[1] 吕靖[1] 王军[1] 张丽丽[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连海事大学交通运输管理学院,辽宁大连116026

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2015年第5期126-131,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：保障我国海上通道安全研究(11JZD049);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(3132014311-1)

摘　　要：针对一些应急物资,采用政府企业联合储备方式储备,可以降低政府储备成本,企业也可以从中获益。本文研究政企联合实物储备的合作机理,分析了联盟参与人之间的博弈关系,建立了联盟收益模型,运用shapley值解决合作的联盟收益分配问题,最后分析了联盟的稳定性。算例分析显示在政企合作联盟中政府和企业关系类似"地主"和"农民"的关系,当企业获得的收益小于其机会成本时,企业不愿意加入联盟,这时政府需对企业进行交叉补贴来维持联盟稳定。缺货成本低于政府储备成本时,政府会考虑与企业联合储备或者选择缺货;缺货成本低于企业储备成本时,政府选择缺货。For some kind of emergency supplies, the joint of government and enterprises can reduce the cost of government, and the enterprises can also benefit from it. This paper studies the mechanism of cooperation be- tween government and enterprises in emergency supplies reserve. First it analyses the game between the alliance participants; then it uses the shapley value to solve the revenue distribution problem in the alliance; finally it an- alyses the stability of the alliance. The example analysis shows that the relationship between the government and enterprises in the alliance is similar to the relationship between ＂landlords＂ and ＂peasants＂ ; the enterprises are reluctant to join the alliance when the earnings they gain are less than their opportunity cost, the government needs to cross - subsidize enterprises to maintain the stability of the alliance. When the shortage cost is less than the cost of government reserve, the government will age cost is less than the cost of enterprise reserve, choose shortage or join with the enterprises. When the short- the government will choose shortage.

关 键 词：管理科学与工程 政企联合 合作机理 博弈 SHAPLEY值 应急物资储备 

分 类 号：X951[环境科学与工程—安全科学] X915.4