不完全契约自我履约机制研究综述  

A Literature Review on Self-enforcement Mechanism of Incomplete Contract

作　　者：米运生[1] 郑秀娟[1] 何柳妮 

机构地区：[1]华南农业大学经济管理学院,广州510642

出　　处：《商业研究》2015年第11期81-88,共8页Commercial Research

基　　金：教育部人文社会规划基金项目;项目编号:14YJA790039;国家自然科学基金项目;项目编号:71333004

摘　　要：市场的有效治理依赖于契约,尽管新古典经济学内含契约完全性假设,但现实中的契约大部分是不完全的。不完全契约的实施主要依赖于自我履约机制,而非传统范式所言的第三方强制,研究契约的自我实施机制对于深化契约治理的理论认识、优化经济主体的契约设计和提升市场治理效率有着重要意义。在介绍不完全契约与自我履约机制本质规定性的基础上,本文从资产专用性、激励、惩罚、声誉和社会资本等方面,对不完全契约自我实施的作用机制进行了文献梳理,在简述现有研究局限的基础上展望了未来研究的扩展方向。An efficient governance of the market heavily relies on the effectiveness of contracts. Although the new classi-cal economics encloses the completeness assumption of contract, but the most are incomplete contracts in reality. The im-plementation of the incomplete contracts depends upon self-enforcement mechanism mainly rather than unconventional enforcement by a third party. Analyzing the self-enforcement mechanism is critical for playing an essential role in deepe-ning theoretical recognition, optimizing the contract design as well as improving the efficiency of market governance. This paper reviews several articles by discussing the self-enforcement mechanism of the incomplete contract and nature regula-tion in terms of its assets specificity, incentive system, punishment penalty, reputation and social capital. What is more, the paper predicts the future trend of research projects.

关 键 词：不完全契约 自我履约 机制 

分 类 号：F062.54[经济管理—政治经济学]