地方政府绩效评估的悖论解析  

The Paradoxes of Local Government Performance Evaluation

作　　者：战旭英[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东社会科学院政治学所

出　　处：《中国行政管理》2015年第11期45-49,共5页Chinese Public Administration

基　　金：山东省社会科学规划项目"政府绩效评估的历史演进和国际比较"(编号:07CZZJ01)

摘　　要：我国地方政府绩效评估是一种非正式的制度安排,由于制度设计不完善,产生诸多悖论效果:指标量化本是政府科学管理的一种努力,却导致选择性关注倾向和努力配置、资源配置的扭曲;基于偏好替代设计的指标体系有一定合理性,但是体现的是评估方和上级领导的偏好,而非公众的偏好;相对绩效评估可以增加评估的精确度,但其弊端正日益显现;基于考核的晋升锦标赛表面上实现了"激励相容",实际却造成"为增长而竞争";等等。问题的解决必须从根源入手,从摒弃绩效合法性入手,在合理界定政府职能的基础上建立结果导向机制和全方位开放机制,完善绩效评估制度。China＇s local government performance evaluation is an informal institutional arrangement. Due to unreasonable system design, many paradoxes have come into being, such as： indictors quantifying is one of the government scientific management efforts, but has led to selective attention and the distortion of efforts configuration and re source allocation; Indictor system designed on the preference alternative has certain rationality, but reflects the preference of assessor and superior leadership rather than the public preferences; Relative performance evalua tion can increase the accuracy of evaluation, but its disadvantages are emerging; The promotion tournament based on the evaluation achieves the ＂incentive compatibility＂ on the surface, but in fact gives rise to ＂compe- tition for growth＂. The solution of these problems must be started from the root, from abandoning the perform ance legitimacy, establishing the result - oriented mechanism and the all - round opening mechanism on the ba- sis of reasonable definition of the government functions to complete the performance evaluation system.

关 键 词：政府绩效评估 制度设计 悖论 

分 类 号：D630.3[政治法律—政治学]