信念概念的不可或缺性论证  

Argumentation for the Indispensability of Faith Concept

作　　者：魏燕侠[1] 郑伟平[1] 

机构地区：[1]华侨大学哲学与社会发展学院,厦门361021

出　　处：《江苏行政学院学报》2015年第6期20-25,共6页The Journal of Jiangsu Administration Institute

基　　金：2013年度国家社会科学基金青年项目"形式知识论研究"(13CZX052);2011年度国家社科基金青年项目"无信念的知识论研究"(11CZX045)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：基于对以信念概念为核心的常识心理学的不同解释,消除主义代表人物丘奇兰德与反消除主义代表人物戴维森、邓尼特以及福多等人进行了激烈的哲学论争。前者主张信念是一个没有意义的、不正确的、过时的哲学概念,信念乃至常识心理学应该予以消除;后者则认为前者的攻击无的放矢,常识心理学是规范和抽象的,因而是免于经验检验的。事实上,信念概念的本体论证明不应该纠缠于常识心理学这一局部的前科学理论,而应回归信念这一全局的抽象概念本身;信念概念之所以是不可消除的,乃是因为对于人类主体的能动性与求知行为而言,它是不可或缺的。Based on the different interpretations of commonsense psychology with faith concept as the core idea, Churchland, representative of the eliminative theory, were engaged in fierce philosophical debates against Davidson, Dunnet and Fodor, representatives of anti-eliminative theories. The former advocates that faith is a pointless, incorrect, and outdated philosophical concept, which should be eliminated together with common sense psychology. The latter maintains that the former＇s attack is groundless, because common sense psychology is normative and abstract, thus is exempt from experience-based test. In fact, the ontological discussion of the faith concept should not be entangled with the partial pre-scientific theory of common sense psychology, but should return to the global abstraction of faith itself. The faith concept can not be eliminated, because it is indispensable to human＇s initiative and knowledge-pursuit activities.

关 键 词：信念 消除主义 常识心理学 不可或缺性论证 

分 类 号：B15[哲学宗教—世界哲学]