自由现金流对过度投资影响的实证研究——基于2010-2014年我国综合类上市公司数据  

An Empirical Study of the Impact of Free Cash Flow on Overinvestment: Based on the Data of Comprehensive Listed Enterprises from 2010 to 2014

作　　者：卓敏 周歌[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学会计学院,安徽蚌埠233000

出　　处：《山西大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2015年第6期91-95,共5页Journal of Shanxi University(Philosophy and Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目(12BGJ039);安徽省教育厅高校人文社科重点项目(SK2015A213)

摘　　要：现代企业所有权和经营权的分离,使股东和经理人间信息不对称。经理人为了实现自身利益最大化,产生过度投资行为,而自由现金流为过度投资行为提供了可能。文章以2010-2014年我国综合类上市公司为样本,利用Stata软件,探讨自由现金流对过度投资行为的影响。实证检验了我国综合类上市公司过度投资行为的存在性以及自由现金流和过度投资行为呈显著正相关,为约束经理人行为进而降低代理成本提供可操作性建议。The separation of ownership and operation in modern enterprises causes the information asymmetry be- tween shareholders and managers. Managers make overinvestment in order to maximize the private benefit and free cash flow provides the possibilities of this behavior. This paper takes comprehensive listed companies from 2010 to 2014 as a sample to discuss the effect of free cash flow on overinvestment by using Stata software. The empirical resuits indicate that the existence of overinvestment and free cash flow have significant positive correlation with overin- vestment which provides operational recommendations for restraining managers and reducing agency cost.

关 键 词：过度投资 自由现金流 综合类上市公司 代理成本 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]