审计师会选择性地抑制盈余管理吗?——基于对非经常性损益盈余管理的实证检验  

Do Auditors Have Discrimination in Suppressing Earnings Management?——Evidence from Extraordinary Profit and Loss

作　　者：路军伟[1] 马威伟 李奇凤[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学管理学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《经济管理》2015年第11期101-112,共12页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"政府会计准则执行机制与执行效果:基于实验与实证的研究"(71572095);国家自然科学基金项目"政府会计改革动力机制与策略选择研究"(71102103)

摘　　要：当审计师面对不同上市公司和不同的盈余管理方式时,其所面临的风险是不同的。为控制风险并确保收益,审计师在区分上市公司和盈余管理方式的基础上有选择地抑制,才符合其自身利益。本研究发现,在上市公司具有扭亏动机且采用了隐性盈余管理方式的情境下,审计师倾向出具标准无保留审计意见;而有扭亏动机的上市公司实施了显性盈余管理,或没有扭亏动机的上市公司实施了隐性盈余管理,审计师都倾向于出具非标准的审计意见;对于有扭亏动机的上市公司,异常审计费用加剧了上市公司利用非经常性损益进行盈余管理的隐性化程度。本研究增加了审计师选择性地抑制盈余管理的经验证据,也为完善我国市场监管规则和报表列报安排等提供了参考。Whether auditors are willing to suppress earnings management depends on the core trade-offs of rev- enues and related risks under specific circumstances. Auditor＇ s risks vary when they face listed companies with va- rious motivations and distinct types of earnings management. In general, listed companies in China have three ways to do earnings management： 1. discretionary accrul（DA） ; 2. real earnings management（REM） ; 3. using extraordi- nary profit and loss. However, it is worth noticing that compared to the disclosure of first two ways of earnings man- agement, the current classification and disclosure of extraordinary profit and loss in China＇ s stock market is so com- plex and implicit that external users of listed companies＇ financial statements can hardly identify earnings manage- ment existing in the account ＂investment income＂, which belongs to the companies＇ extraordinary profit and loss and may be announced vaguely at the corner of listed companies＇ financial statements. As a result, the chances that earnings management to be identified by external users depend on the transparency of measures taken by listed com- panies. In other words, auditors＇ risks of being proved immoral under this specific circumstance can be relatively low. As rational economic man, auditors tend to inhibit earnings management selectively through issuing modified audit reports regarding the balance of their potential revenue against the related risk Using pooled cross-sectional data from 2009 to 2013 of China＇ s A-share market listed companies, this study fo- cus on the phenomenon that as the amount and nature of companies using earnings management vary, the chances of their receiving modified audit reports differ. This study presents empirical evidence that auditors are willing to lower their thresholds for issuing modified audit reports under the condition that listed companies have ＂anti-loss motiva- tion＂ and take implicit means to do earnings management. It is because under this circumstanc

关 键 词：盈余管理 非经常性损益 审计意见 异常审计费用 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]