终极所有权结构对银行贷款契约的影响——来自中国上市公司的经验证据  

The Effect of Ultimate Wwnership Structure upon Bank Loan Contract Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies

作　　者：肖作平[1] 张樱[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2015年第11期19-30,共12页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家自然科学基金"终极所有权结构;社会资本与银行贷款契约(项目编号:71472157);国家自然科学基金"终极控制股东;投资者法律保护与会计稳健性"(项目编号:71272140)和国家自然科学基金"终极所有权结构;制度环境与权益资本成本"(项目编号:71002062)的资助)]

摘　　要：本文从代理成本视角理论推演终极所有权结构(终极控制股东的控制权、现金流量权、控制权和现金流量权之间的分离度、金字塔层级、终极控制股东类型)对银行贷款契约(贷款利率、贷款金额、贷款期限、贷款担保)的影响机制。实证研究发现:(1)终极控制股东的控制权越强、控制权和现金流量权之间的分离度越大、金字塔层级数量越多,银行贷款契约越紧缩(贷款利率越高、贷款金额越少、贷款期限越短、贷款担保越严格),反之亦然;(2)终极控制股东的现金流量权越多、终极控制股东类型是国有属性,银行贷款契约越宽松(贷款利率越低、贷款金额越多、贷款期限越长、贷款担保越宽松)。This article analyses the mechanism of how the ultimate ownership structure which includes the control rights of the firm＇s largest ultimate owner, the cash-flow rights, the deviation between control rights and cash-flow rights, the pyramid ownership structure, and the type of largest ultimate owner influences the bank loan contract with the inclusion of the rate, amount, maturity, and guarantee of the loan based on theoretical deduction from the point of agency cost theory. Generally speaking, the results show that the stronger the control rights of the largest ultimate owner, the greater the divergence between control and cashflow rights, or the more the pyramid layers are, the tighter the bank loan contracts will be（the higher rate, the less amount, the shorter maturity, and the stricter guarantee of the loan）, vice versa. On the contrary, the more the cash-flow rights of the largest ultimate owner are, or the largest-owner is the state-owned property, the looser the bank loan contracts will be（the lower rate, the more amount, the longer maturity, and the looser guarantee of the loan）.

关 键 词：终极所有权结构 控制权 现金流量权 控制权和现金流量权的分离度 银行贷款契约 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]