“三下”压煤开采中企业与农民的不完全信息动态博弈  

“Three under”pressure in the coal mining enterprises and the farmers' incomplete information dynamic game

作　　者：刘璐[1] 潘倩倩[1] 王卓[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学(北京)管理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《中国矿业》2015年第11期9-11,70,共4页China Mining Magazine

基　　金：2014年国家级大学生创新计划项目资助(编号:20100023120016)

摘　　要：近年来对"三下"压煤的开采已被越来越多的人关注,关注的焦点主要是压煤开采的可行性,而突出问题是农民与企业的利益冲突。本文根据山西省临县庞庞塔村塌陷实际情况以及企业和农民的利益关系,在以前研究成果的基础上,进行了压煤开采影响因素的分析,提出新的分析压煤开采利益冲突的模型。模型主要针对企业与农民进行博弈分析,采用不完全信息动态博弈的方法对不同情况下企业和农民的决策进行研究,通过对模型结果的分析找出农民、企业利益均衡点,得到企业农民在不同的现实情况下的最佳策略。进而得出双方利益均衡时的各自收益及利益总和。In recent years,more and more people have been paying close attention to the threeunderground mining,focusing on the feasibility of mining pressed coal,and the main problem is the conflicts of interest between farmers and companies.According to the actual situation of the collapse of Shanxi Province Lin County PangPangTa as well as interest of enterprises and farmers,on the basis of previous research results,we analyzed the influence factors of mining pressed coal,and put forward a new model to analyze the conflicts of interest.With the dynamic game of incomplete information,we found the equilibrium point of interest between enterprises and farmers.Through the best strategy in different practical cases we found,it is easy to get the profits of the two sides when they get the equilibrium value.

关 键 词：动态博弈 利益相关方 压煤开采 

分 类 号：C939[经济管理—管理学]