财政分权、审计监督与反腐败成效——来自中国2002～2011年的经验证据  

Fiscal Decentralization,Audit Supervision and Anti-corruption Effectiveness:An Empirical Evidence of 2002-2011 from China

作　　者：黄溶冰[1] 赵谦[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京审计学院审计系,江苏南京211815 [2]哈尔滨商业大学财政与公共管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150028

出　　处：《中南财经政法大学学报》2015年第6期19-25,159,共7页Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"我国多级政府债务风险协同预警机制研究"(14BGL030);江苏省高校"青蓝工程"中青年学术带头人项目;江苏省高校优势学科"现代审计科学"(PAPD)项目

摘　　要：本文以2002～2011年中国31个省区的面板数据为样本,将审计监督作为调节变量,采用动态面板数据模型的广义矩估计方法,实证检验财政分权和审计监督对反腐败成效的影响,研究发现：一方面财政分权与地区腐败水平之间呈显著的负相关关系,验证了财政分权对地区腐败具有抑制作用的假设;另一方面财政分权对地区腐败水平的影响受到审计监督的约束,作为一种权力制约机制,审计监督的处罚力度越大,越有可能增强财政分权对腐败的抑制作用,从而降低地区腐败水平。Based on the panel data between 2002 and 2011in 31 Chinese regions,this paper takes audit supervision as the moderator and makes an empirical test of the impact of fiscal decentralization and audit supervision on the effectiveness of anti-corruption by means of generalized method moment and dynamic panel data model.The study reveals that,on the one hand,there is a significant negative relation between fiscal decentralization and regional corruption,which verifies the hypothesis of inhibition;on the other hand,the impact of fiscal decentralization on regional corruption is constrained by audit supervision,as a control mechanism,the greater the audit punishment is,the more inhibitory effect of fiscal decentralization on corruption will be,thereby reducing the level of corruption in the region.The research findings of this paper provide further empirical evidence for a comprehensive understanding of the economic consequences of China's national audit,and also enrich the research literature on the impact of the national governance mechanism on the effectiveness of anti-corruption.

关 键 词：财政分权 审计监督 腐败 国家审计 

分 类 号：F239.0[经济管理—会计学]