弗雷格坍塌、弹弓论证与共指替换——评颜青山对句子指称的分析  

Frege's Collapse,Slingshot and Co-referential Substitution:A Comment on Yan Qingshan's Analysis of Sentences' Reference

作　　者：张鑫毅[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学哲学系

出　　处：《哲学分析》2015年第5期32-40,共9页Philosophical Analysis

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金2015年度规划项目(项目编号:15JA720003)"实践知性与行动动机"的阶段性成果

摘　　要：弗雷格所持句子指称真值的主张导致"弗雷格坍塌",即所有真句子指称真,所有假句子指称假。这一点为丘奇、哥德尔等人的"弹弓论证"所证明。要避免这种后果,应当审查弗雷格的两个预设:限定摹状词是专名的观点和组合性原则。罗素通过摹状词理论消除了坍塌,但其理论存在基本缺陷。颜青山试图表明弗雷格误用了组合性原则并得出句子指称事态而非真值,但他的论证是不成功的。Gottlob Frege's claim that sentences refer to truth-values causes the problem called 'Frege's collapse', i.e. all true sentences' reference is the 'true' and all false sentences' reference is the 'false'. This is proved by the slingshot argument that has been raised by philosophers such as Alonzo Church and Kurt G觟del. In order to evade this unpleasant result, we should check two of Frege's presuppositions: the view that definite descriptions are names and the principle of compositionality.Bertrand Russell avoids collapse by his theory of description, but it has some kind of fundamental defect.Professor Yan tries to indicate that Frege has misused the principle of compositionality, and points out that sentences refer to state of affairs rather than truth-values, but his argument is unsuccessful.

关 键 词：弗雷格坍塌 弹弓论证 限定摹状词 组合性原则 

分 类 号：B812[哲学宗教—逻辑学]