煤电产业纵向联盟定价研究——基于讨价还价博弈模型  

Research on Vertical Alliance Pricing of Coal-electricity Industry Based on the Bargaining Game Model

作　　者：原毅军[1] 郭钰[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理与经济学部,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《经济问题》2015年第11期47-53,共7页On Economic Problems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"产学研技术联盟中的技术对接机制研究"(71073013);国家社会科学基金重点项目"污染减排对产业结构调整的倒逼传导机制及政策研究"(11AZD029)

摘　　要：煤电价格矛盾是影响我国经济生活的一个突出问题,也是政府部门和学者们一直关注的焦点。而作为市场主体的煤电企业对煤电价格的确定从根本上讲是由双方谈判所决定的。从煤电谈判这一热点事件切入,利用讨价还价博弈模型来分析煤电产业纵向联盟定价问题。结果证明在煤电企业成本既定的情况下,谈判双方的利润同时受到各方贴现因子、谈判破裂风险概率以及谈判参与者外部选择的影响。最后根据研究结果提出了关于煤电产业纵向联盟定价的几点政策建议,包括建立科学合理的电煤价格信息监测体系,完善煤电市场机制以及调整和优化产业结构、健全节能市场机制。Coal-electricity contradiction is a prominent problem affecting China＇ s economy, which is also the focus of government and scholars. The price of coal is determined by the negotiations between two parties which are market entities. Based on this, this paper starts from coal - electricity negotiating, using bargaining game model to analyze the vertical alliance pricing problem of coal - electricity industry. The result shows that under the condition of the given cost of coal - electricity enterprises, the two sides＇ profit at the same time is effected by the discount rate, negotiation failure risk probability and the negotiators outside option. At last, this paper proposes some policy recommendations on the vertical alliance pricing problem of coal - electricity industry, including establishing scien- tific and reasonable thermal coal price information monitoring system, improving the mechanism of coal and electrici- ty market, adjusting and optimizing of industrial structure and improving the mechanism of energy market.

关 键 词：煤电产业 纵向联盟 定价 讨价还价博弈 

分 类 号：F206[经济管理—国民经济]