诱导信息条件下车辆路径选择——基于有限理性模糊博弈  

Research on the Model of Vehicle Routing Choice Based on the Condition of the Bounded Rationality Fuzzy Game with Inducing Information

作　　者：周代平[1] 李康奇 贺琳[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学交通运输学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《重庆工商大学学报（自然科学版）》2015年第12期31-35,共5页Journal of Chongqing Technology and Business University:Natural Science Edition

摘　　要：诱导信息属于建议性信息,当诱导信息发布以后驾驶员并不一定接受诱导信息;在行为强化理论基础上,建立了基于有限理性模糊博弈的诱导信息条件下车辆路径选择模型,并通过仿真得出了不同初始状态下的博弈平衡结果;仿真结果表明:诱导信息的发布并不一定能改善路网交通流分布,它与路网总流量以及初始接受诱导的车辆比例密切相关.The inducing information belongs to recommended information,so drivers do not necessarily accept the induction after the inducing information released. This paper,based on the theory of reinforcement,establishes the model of vehicle routing choice based on the condition of fuzzy game with inducing information and obtains the result of balance of the game under the different initial state through simulation.The simulation results show that the release of the induction information does not necessarily improve the road network traffic flow distribution,which is closely related to the proportion of the total flow of the road network and the initial acceptance of the induction vehicles.

关 键 词：模糊博弈 有限理性 交通诱导 自学习机制 

分 类 号：U491.23[交通运输工程—交通运输规划与管理]