政策性负担、信息督查与逆向软预算约束——对项目运作中地方政府组织行为的一个解释  

Policy Burden,Information Monitor and Inverted Soft Budget Constraint:An explanation of the local government behaviors in the process of project operation

作　　者：狄金华[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中农业大学社会学系,农村社会建设与管理研究中心

出　　处：《社会学研究》2015年第6期49-72,243,共24页Sociological Studies

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"转型期农村社会管理机制创新研究"(12CSH009);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目"农村社会治理中的政府行为研究"(2014PY023);湖北省科技支撑计划软科学研究项目"城镇化进程中湖北农村基层社会治理创新研究"(2014BDF102)的资助

摘　　要：本研究在"逆向软预算约束"概念的基础上,区分了政府行为的目标属性(内生—外生)对预算软约束的影响,比较了内生目标与外生目标所诱致的逆向软预算约束行为在发生机制、行为逻辑及基本后果等层面的差异。本文以茶县农业综合开发项目中的配套任务落实为例,考察了财力不济的地方政府在面对旨在激励其行为的配套制度时,通过向项目受益方转嫁配套任务而软化自身的财力约束,进而令上级设置的激励制度失灵。This paper is based on the concept of 'soft budget constraint',and analyzes the ways in which different target properties(both endogenous and exogenous targets) in government behaviors can affect the soft budget constraint.It analyzes the differences between two soft budget constraints at the levels of generating mechanism,behavior logic and consequences.The two soft budget constraints are caused by the endogenous target and exogenous target respectively.This paper uses the example of an operation process of a rural county comprehensive development to examine how the local government,short of financial support while carrying out the proportional fund-supporting project,chooses to transfer the proportional fund-supporting project to the project beneficiary in order to lessen its own financial burden.This behavior causes the faillure of the motivation system,despite the fact that it is originally set up by the higher-level government to motivate the local government for better behavior.

关 键 词：目标属性 政策性负担 软预算约束 信息督查 逆向软预算约束 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学] F812.3[政治法律—中外政治制度]