第三方惩罚机制与双边合作秩序的维持——来自房地产征用补偿的实验证据  

Third party punishment and maintenance of bilateral cooperation——From the experimental evidence of real estate expropriation compensation

作　　者：廖玉玲[1,2] 洪开荣[2] 张亮[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖南财政经济学院法学与公共管理系,长沙410205 [2]中南大学商学院,长沙410083

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2015年第11期2798-2808,共11页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71171203);教育部博士点基金(20130162110076)

摘　　要：惩罚机制已被广泛认为是执行社会规范的有效机制.引入房地产征用补偿实验背景,设计了标准独裁者博弈实验,第二方惩罚的标准最后通牒博弈实验以及第三方惩罚的补偿调整情形独裁者博弈实验组成的三合一实验,研究了第三方惩罚机制对双边合作的影响.研究结果表明:行为人在不同类型实验中呈现出行为异质性,第二方和第三方为维持双边合作秩序会对利益分配不公平行为进行不同的惩罚行为;惩罚行为的伤害能力随着第三方的介入变得更加强大,进而有效地维持了双边合作秩序.因此,与第二方惩罚机制相比较,引入惩罚伤害性强的第三方惩罚机制更有利于双边合作秩序的维持,此结论对解决我国房地产征用补偿纠纷等社会合作难点问题提供了一定的政策借鉴依据.The punishment has been widely regarded as an effective mechanism to promote social norms. This paper introduces the background of the real estate expropriation compensation, with the experimental design of standard dictator game, standard ultimatum game and dictator game of compensation adjustment circumstances, and we study the impact of third-party punishment in the bilateral cooperation. The experiment shows heterogeneity of human behavior in different types of experiments. Namely, the second party and the third party will make different degrees of punishment behavior in order to maintain bilateral cooperation in the unfair distribution of benefits. Additionally, the damage capability of punishment behavior becomes more powerful with adding the third party, and thus it effectively maintains bilateral cooperation. Therefore, comparing with the second party punishment mechanism, third-party punishment mechanism is more conducive to the maintenance of bilateral cooperation. It gives some policy references on social cooperation dilemmas, such as real estate expropriation compensation system reform.

关 键 词：惩罚 第三方 第二方 合作 征用补偿 

分 类 号：F293.3[经济管理—国民经济]