劳资关系演化博弈分析——以珠三角地区为背景  

Analysis on Evolutionary Game Theory of Labor Relations in Pearl River Delta

作　　者：曹铭[1] 张成科[2] 朱怀念[2] 

机构地区：[1]广东工业大学管理学院,广东广州510520 [2]广东工业大学经济与贸易学院,广东广州510520

出　　处：《广东工业大学学报》2015年第4期1-7,共7页Journal of Guangdong University of Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171061);广东省普通高校人文社会科学研究资助项目(11WYXM022);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2014M552177);广州市社会科学规划项目(11Y39)

摘　　要：我国企业在快速发展的同时,劳资矛盾也日益突出.在珠三角地区的背景下,运用演化博弈的理论,建立劳资双方以及资方和政府的博弈模型,通过模型求解和演化相图分析,找出演化稳定策略及劳资关系发展的影响因素,发现与生产成本、利润分配、背叛的收益、违约的惩罚等因素相关.针对分析结果分别从劳方、资方、政府监管部门的角度出发,提出相关建议,促使劳资关系走向稳定和谐.With the economic development in China, labor conflicts have become increasingly conspicuous. Based on the background of PRD（Pearl River Delta）region, this paper intends to apply evolutionary game theory to establish game models for employers and employees as well as employers and the government respectively, and then to identify evolutionarily stable strategies and find factors affecting the development of labor relations by solving the model, analyzing evolution chart and the related factors such as production costs, distribution of profits, revenue of betrayal and default fine, etc. According to the results of analysis, the relevant recommendations for the employees, employers, and government regulators will be posed, which are beneficial to promote stable and harmonious to labor relations.

关 键 词：劳资关系 政府监管 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F240[经济管理—劳动经济]