基于演化博弈的助学贷款违约风险管理策略——高校与银行的行为视角  

Default Risk Management Strategies of Student Loans Based on Evolutionary Game——From the Behavior Perspective of Higher Education Institutions and Banks

作　　者：于基伯[1] 刘传哲[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221116

出　　处：《东北大学学报（社会科学版）》2015年第6期595-599,630,共6页Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science)

基　　金：江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划资助项目(CXZZ11_0320);江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究资助项目(2015SJD445);中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(2013ZDIXM12)

摘　　要：经过演化博弈研究发现,银行助学贷款发放成本越高,高校选择配合催收的概率越大;在风险补偿机制启动阈值较高、高校承担的风险补偿金比例低的情况下,高校配合催收的实际效果会比较差。因此,为降低国家助学贷款的违约风险,应给予经办银行向上调整助学贷款利息率的权限,尽量使每个经办银行形成助学贷款的规模效应。同时,提高贷款违约率高的学校管理助学贷款的成本,推动经办银行对出现多期违约的毕业生采取相关的法律追讨措施,共同做好国家助学贷款的违约风险管理。Based on the evolutionary game theory,a model was built to explore the strategy selection of higher education institutions and banks in the risk management of national student loans.It was found that the higher the cost of student loans is, the more likely higher education institutions will take cooperative measures.The actual effect of default loan collection implemented by higher education institutions will be relatively poor in the condition that the starting threshold value of risk compensation mechanisms is bigger and the management responsibility of higher education institutions is comparatively small.Therefore,to reduce the default risk of national student loans,banks should be given permission to raise the interest of student loans,and each administering bank should offer sizable student loans. Meanwhile,the cost of student loan management should be increased among the institutions whose graduates have higher default rates,and the issuing banks of national student loans should be urged to take legal actions at those who have multi-period defaults in order to improve the default risk management of national student loans.

关 键 词：国家助学贷款 违约风险 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F812[经济管理—财政学] G640[文化科学—高等教育学]