网络直销型制造商开辟新渠道模式选择分析  

Analysis of new channel mode selection for Internet direct manufacturer

作　　者：曾伟[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]合肥工业大学数学学院,安徽合肥230009 [2]合肥工业大学管理学院,安徽合肥230009

出　　处：《合肥工业大学学报（自然科学版）》2015年第11期1570-1575,共6页Journal of Hefei University of Technology：Natural Science

基　　金：国家自然科学青年基金资助项目(71201044);安徽省级优秀青年人才基金重点资助项目(2013SQRW003ZD);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(J2014HGXJ0069;2015HGZX0021)

摘　　要：文章从网络直销型制造商的角度研究了其开辟新渠道模式选择的问题。假设制造商已经拥有一条网络直销渠道,分别研究了制造商Stackelberg、零售商Stackelberg和双方Nash均衡3种不同权力结构下的双渠道定价策略;进一步讨论了制造商开辟新渠道需要满足的条件,分析了条件的改变对各方利润的影响。结果表明,制造商可以通过改变渠道投入力度来进行渠道模式选择。在渠道选择上应坚持"一主一辅"的原则,即以网络直销渠道为主,开辟零售渠道作为补充;或只保留很少部分的网络直销渠道,转为以零售渠道销售为主。而投入力度相当将会造成内耗,损失各方利益。New channel mode selection problems are studied from the Internet direct manufacturer＇s point of view. Assuming that the manufacturer already has an Internet direct distribution channel, the dual-channel pricing strategies are given under three different power structures, namely manufacturer Stackelberg, retailer Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium between the two parties. The conditions to add new channel for manufacturer are discussed and the influence of the change of conditions on the parties is analyzed. The results show that the manufacturer can change the channel model selection by intensity of input. The manufacturer should insist on the principle of ＂one primary, one secondary＂, i. e. either mainly taking Internet direct channel and retail channel as complementary or mainly taking retail channel and keeping only very small part of Internet direct channel as a supplement. But equivalent intensity of input may cause internal friction and damage the profits of all members.

关 键 词：双渠道定价 Stackelberg博弈Nash博弈 

分 类 号：O227[理学—运筹学与控制论]