金融消费者保护:信息不对称、双重道德风险的防范  

Financial Consumer Protection:the Prevention of Information Asymmetry and Double Moral Hazards

作　　者：崔金珍[1] 邓露露[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学法学院,天津300222

出　　处：《湖南大学学报（社会科学版）》2015年第6期156-160,共5页Journal of Hunan University(Social Sciences)

基　　金：天津财经大学研究生科研资助计划(2014TCS08)

摘　　要：对金融消费者进行保护的最根本原因是金融交易中的金融机构处于信息优势地位而引发的道德风险问题损害了处于弱势地位的金融消费者的合法权益。然而,通常容易被忽视的是当金融消费者处于信息优势地位及过度的金融消费者保护而引发的道德风险问题。通过运用经济学当中的信息不对称理论、委托代理理论对金融交易中产生的双重道德风险进行分析,更好地防范双重道德风险的产生,保护金融消费者的权益。The fundamental reason for financial consumer protection is that the moral hazards triggered by the dominant position of financial institutions impair financial consumers＇ legitimate rights and interests. Generally speaking, financial consumers need to be protected due to their weak position in financial transactions. However, the moral hazards, which are triggered by the dominant position of financial consumers and excessive protection, most often get overlooked. In order to better protect financial consumers and prevent double moral hazards, this paper uses the information asymmetric theory and the principle-agent theory to analyze the double moral hazards in financial transactions.

关 键 词：金融消费者 道德风险 信息不对称 

分 类 号：D912.28[政治法律—民商法学]